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WHEN ANALOGY FAILS:
THE COMMON LAW & STATE V. MANN*
JOHN V. ORTH**

Judge Thomas Ruffin's decision in State v. Mann is notorious
for its holding that no law restricts a slave owner's power to
chastise a slave: "The power of the master must be absolute to
render the submission of the slave perfect." Yet, the reasoning
supporting this holding-that the common law recognized no
relationship analogous to the condition of slavery-is actually a
curious tribute to the common law's tradition of freedom. In
England, where the common law began, the same absence of
analogy formed the basis for the decision in Somerset's Case in
favor of freedom for a slave.
The characteristic form of legal reasoning in the common law is
reasoning by analogy.' When a common law court is called upon to
resolve a dispute to which no immediately obvious rule is applicable,
the judge searches legal memory for a similar dispute that has already
been resolved. The basic pattern of legal reasoning has consequently
been described as a three-step process: first, a similar case is located;
second, the rule established in that case is identified; third, the rule is
applied to resolve the present dispute.2
When, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, North
Carolina judges confronted novel issues involving the treatment of
slaves, they sought to resolve the disputes by the time-hallowed
method of analogical reasoning. For example, in State v. Hale,3
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1. Cf STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & LEGAL REASONING 25

(1995) ("Legal reasoning takes two principal forms: One is analogical, the other is
deductive."). Deductive reasoning is particularly appropriate when reasoning from a
statute. See C. K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 161 (7th ed. 1964).
2. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949).
3. 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582 (1823).
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decided in 1823, superior court Judge Joseph J. Daniel4 presided over
a case in which the defendant was charged with criminal assault on
another man's slave.5 Although the jury found that the defendant had
in fact struck the slave, superior court Judge Daniel ruled as a matter
of law that assault on a slave was not a criminal offense and dismissed
the case. The decision apparently rested on the ground that slaves
were the property of their owners, and therefore, the proper legal

remedy for assault on a slave was a civil suit by the owner, not a
criminal prosecution by the State.6 The State appealed this ruling to

the North Carolina Supreme Court, which reversed the trial court and
remanded for a new trial.
Chief Justice John Louis Taylor 7 explained the result on appeal
by invoking traditional common law methods.8 "As there is no

positive law decisive of the question a solution of it must be deduced
from general principles, from reasonings founded on the common
law, adapted to the existing condition and circumstances of our
society, and indicating that result which is best adapted to general
expedience." 9 Assault is a crime as well as a tort, Taylor reasoned;

considered in this light, the status of the victim is not material.
Therefore, he concluded, there is "as much reason for making such
offen[s]es indictable as if a white man had been the victim."'" In
other words, an assault on a slave is essentially the same as an assault
on a free person.

Since the status of the victim did not preclude the prosecution,
the proper issue at trial should have been whether the defendant had
4. Joseph J. Daniel (1783-1848) served as a superior court judge from 1816 until
1833 when he resigned to serve on the state supreme court. NORTH CAROLINA
GOVERNMENT 1585-1979: A NARRATIVE AND STATISTICAL HISTORY 360-61 (John L.

Cheney, Jr. ed., 1981) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT].
5. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 582. The indictment seems to have charged an "assault
and battery," but the report speaks interchangeably of "assault" and "battery." Id. The
victim is not named in the report. Id.
6. Id.
7. John Louis Taylor (1769-1829) became the first chief justice of the newly
constituted state supreme court in 1819 and served until his death in 1829 when he was
succeeded by Leonard Henderson. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, supra note 4, at
360-61.
8. There was no opinion of the court. As such, Justice John Hall agreed with Chief
Justice Taylor in a brief opinion, and Justice Leonard Henderson concurred without
opinion.
9. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 582. Although "positive law" has a particular meaning
in the jurisprudence of John Austin, the influential founder of analytical jurisprudence,
Taylor used it in the general sense of "enacted law." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1200 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004).
10. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 584.
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any legal defense. Since there was no legal relationship between the
defendant and the victim other than the basic relationship incident to
the social order, the availability of a defense depended on whether
the victim had provoked the assault. 1 State law recognized that some
forms of provocation would justify an assault. 2 On this issue, the
difference in the status of the victim did matter: "many circumstances
which would not constitute a legal provocation for a battery
committed by one white man on another would justify it if committed
on a slave, provided the battery were [sic] not excessive."' 3 In other
words, although a slave and a white victim were sufficiently similar to
sustain an indictment for an assault on either, they were significantly
different when the issue was one of provocation. A "white man"
would have to tolerate some forms of provocation from another white
man that would justify assault on a slave.
When six years later Judge Daniel decided State v. Mann, 4
which also concerned an alleged assault on a slave, he held that the
indictment was maintainable, perhaps remembering Chief Justice
Taylor's holding in the prior case. 5 Because the defendant, John
Mann, had hired the slave from her owner, Judge Daniel reasoned
that he had "only a special property in the slave"' 6 and was, therefore,
more like a stranger than an owner. The case, then, was essentially
the same as State v. Hale. The proper issue for the jury was whether
there had been provocation, and if so, whether the force used had
been "excessive."' 7 Finding that the slave had committed "some
small offen[s]e" 8 for which the defendant had attempted to chastise

11.

See generally JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 30 (1992)

(listing four categories that constituted legally adequate provocation).
12. In criminal law, provocation includes acts or words by one person that affects
another person's reason and self-control, causing the other to commit a crime impulsively.
"Adequate provocation can reduce a criminal charge, as from murder to manslaughter."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supranote 9, at 1262.
13. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 586. Taylor had earlier said something similar: "[T]he
homicide of a slave may be extenuated by acts, which would not produce a legal
provocation if done by a white person." State v. Tackett, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 210, 217
(1820), overruled by State v. Watson, 287 N.C. 147, 287 S.E.2d 85 (1975).
14. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829). In this Article, quotations from State v. Mann are
from Devereux's Law Reports. The case is reprinted without the summary of the
Attorney General's argument and with minor changes at 13 N.C. 263 (1829). As in State v.
Hale, the indictment charged an "assault and battery," but again the report uses the words
interchangeably. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263. The victim is identified as "Lydia, the
slave of one Elizabeth Jones." Id.
15. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 584.
16. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263.
17. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 586.
18. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263.
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her and that the defendant had injured the slave by firing a pistol at
her when she began to run away, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The defendant appealed his conviction to the North Carolina
Supreme Court, where the State, through Attorney General Romulus
Saunders, 19 argued in support of the superior court's verdict.
Saunders contended that "no difference existed between this case and
that of ...State v. Hall."2 The proper issue was therefore, as Judge
Daniel had ruled, whether the defendant had used excessive force,
and the jury verdict was supported by the evidence because "the
weapon used was one calculated to produce death."21 Citing the
American edition of an influential English legal treatise, Russell on
Crimes,22 Saunders "assimilated the relation between a master and a
slave, to those existing between parents and children, masters and
apprentices, and tutors and scholars"a 3-relationships in which only
the use of reasonable force could be justified.
But this time, in an opinion for the court written by newly
appointed Justice Thomas Ruffin,24 the supreme court reversed the
conviction and entered judgment for the defendant. Judge Daniel
had been wrong again! His analogy failed. "The Judge below ...put
[the case] on the ground, that the Defendant had but a special
property" interest in the slave,25 but Ruffin pointed out that under the
laws of North Carolina "the hirer and possessor of a slave, in relation
to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner."26 One
who hired a slave was, therefore, more like an owner than a stranger.
Although Ruffin did not cite authorities, the general law of lessor-

19. Romulus Saunders (1791-1867) was Attorney General from 1828 to 1834. NORTH
supra note 4, at 182.
20. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263.
21. Id.
22. WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS 866
(1st Am. ed. 1824). Sir William Holdsworth describes Russell's treatise as a "classic." 13
CAROLINA GOVERNMENT,

WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 437 (3d ed. 1952). It was first

published in England under the title A Treatise on Felonies & Misdemeanors in 1819. Id.
at 464. Russell's influential work has maintained its position as a leading treatise on
BIOGRAPHICAL
criminal law and reached a Twelfth English edition in 1964.
DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 456-57 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1984).
23. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263-64.
24. Thomas Ruffin (1787-1870) served as a superior court judge (1816-18; 1825-28),
state supreme court reporter (1820-21), and president of the state bank (1828-29) before
he was elected to the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1829. In 1833 he became chief
justice, a post he held until 1852. 5 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY
266-67 (William S. Powell ed., 1994).
25. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 264-65.
26. Id. at 265.
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lessee and of bailor-bailee certainly supported his point.27 In both
cases, the possessor (whether lessee or bailee) has many of the rights
of an outright owner and is, as Ruffin said, the owner "for the time

being.

28

But this only shifted the question to that of the legal rights of
slave owners with respect to assaults on their own slaves. The treatise
cited by Attorney General Saunders catalogued the cases in which
"force used against.., another may be justified:"29
[I]f an officer having a warrant against one who will not suffer
himself to be arrested, beat or wound him, in the attempt to
take him; or if a parent, in a reasonable manner, chastise his
child; or a master his servant, being actually in his service at the
time; or a schoolmaster his scholar; or a gaoler his prisoner; or
if one confine a friend who is mad, and bind and beat him, [et]c.
in such a manner as is proper in such circumstances; or if a man
force a sword from one who offers to kill another therewith; or
if a man gently lay his hands upon another, and thereby stay
him from inciting a dog against a third person; no assault or
battery will be committed by such acts. a"
The list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative in the
common law manner. A later case similar to any of those listed
should be decided the same way. The question in State v. Mann, then,
resolved itself into the question of whether the master-slave relation
was like any of these; if so, only reasonable force could be used.
Ruffin explained the supreme court's decision in an opinion
written throughout in the antiphonal style of like-and-unlike, from
the stately introdiction to the chilling conclusion. The first line-"[a]
Judge cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are brought
into judgment"-was soon followed by its contradiction: "[i]t is
useless however, to complain .... [a]nd it is criminal in a Court to
avoid any responsibility which the laws impose."31 Ruffin conceded
that "[u]pon the face of the indictment, the case is the same as the
State v. Hall [sic]" and reaffirmed the decision in that case: "No fault
27. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 267 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) ("[T]he
tenant is a purchaser of an estate in land."). The principal forms of conveyance at
common law were feoffment, lease, grant, and mortgage. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY 215 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). A bailee can maintain an action for
possession (replevin) or damages (trover).

PERSONAL PROPERTY 390-91 (2d ed. 1955).
28. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 265.
29. RUSSELL, supra note 22, at 867.
30. Id. at 867-68.
31. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 264.

RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF
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is found with the rule then adopted; nor would be, if it were now
open." Once again, this was quickly contradicted: "But it is not open
32
.. ; the evidence makes this a different case.
Observing that Judge Daniel had based his ruling on the fact that
the defendant had only hired the slave and did not own her outright,
Ruffin paused over the technicality that the indictment charged the
defendant with assaulting a slave belonging to someone else.3 3 "This
opinion would, perhaps dispose of this particular case," because the
indictment did not charge the defendant with assaulting a slave who
belonged (at least temporarily) to himself. Yet, Ruffin disdained to
rest the decision on that technicality. Instead, he chose to answer
now the question that would inevitably follow: what was the extent of
the criminal liability of a slave owner for an assault on his own slave?
"But upon the general question, whether the owner is answerable
criminaliter,for a battery upon his own slave... the Court entertains
34
but little doubt.
Reaching the heart of the matter, Ruffin addressed the analogies
supplied in support of the judgment below by Attorney General
Saunders. Slavery had "indeed been assimilated at the bar to the
other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the wellestablished principles which confer and restrain the authority of the
parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over the
apprentice, have been pressed on us. ' 35 Whether these social
relations were similar or different was the key step in Ruffin's legal
reasoning. "There is no likeness between the cases," he concluded.
"They are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf
between them. '36 Ruffin explained that the object of the institution
of slavery is "the profit of the master, his security and the public
safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person and his posterity, to
live without knowledge and without the capacity to make anything his

own, and to toil that another may reap

...

. ",37

The slave is therefore

32. Id.
33. Id. at 265 ("[T]he indictment, which charges a battery upon the slave of Elizabeth
Jones, is not supported by proof of a battery upon [d]efendant's own slave; since different
justifications may be applicable to the two cases.").
34. Id. Criminaliter means simply "criminally." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 9, at 402. It is contrasted with civiliter, which means "civilly." Id. at 263.
35. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 265.
36. Id. Ruffin was of the same opinion twenty years later. See State v. Cesar, 31 N.C.
(9 Ired.) 391, 415 (1849) (Ruffin, C.J., dissenting) ("The dissimilarity in the condition of
slaves from anything known at the common law cannot be denied; and, therefore, as it
appears to me, the rules upon this, as upon all other kinds of intercourse between white
men and slaves, must vary from those applied by the common law .....
37. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266.
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unlike the child, pupil, or apprentice who with the passage of time
enjoys the fruits of her own labor.3 8
If there is no similarity between the master-slave relation and
those other domestic relations, or indeed between the master-slave
relation and any other human relation known to the common law,
then analogy fails and the game of like and unlike is over. When the
common law method fails, the common law itself fails. Because there
is no analogy, there is no law. Without a legal rule to restrain the
force that may be applied by the master to the slave, the relation of
master and slave is essentially lawless, as Ruffin candidly admitted:
"The power of the master must be absolute to render the submission
of the slave perfect."3 9 The common law, however, had never
recognized any relation conferring on one person absolute power
over another.40 Indeed, although Ruffin did not mention it, the only
instance when absolute power had been known to the common law
was the medieval condition of outlawry, but then one was literally
outside the law.41

38. Thirty years later, as part of the Reconstruction program to abolish slavery, the
North Carolina Constitution of 1868 headed the state's Declaration of Rights with the
ringing words: "We hold it to be self-evident that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness." N.C. CONST.
of 1868, art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). The current state constitution carries forward the
same language, changing only "all men are created equal" to "all persons are created
equal"-a change introduced into the 1868 Constitution by amendment in 1946. N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 1; see JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 38-39 (1993).
39. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266.
40. Indeed in State v. Hale, Chief Justice Taylor had observed in dictum that "[tihe
common law has often been called into efficient operation for the punishment of ...
needless and wanton barbarity exercised even by masters upon their slaves." 9 N.C. (2
Hawks) 582, 585 (1823).
41. Sir William Blackstone described outlawry in his eighteenth-century
Commentaries on the Laws of England:
Anciently an outlawed felon was said to have caput lupinum, and might be
knocked on the head like a wolf, by any one that should meet him: because having
renounced all law, he was to be dealt with as in a state of nature, when everyone
that should find him might slay him: yet now, to avoid such inhumanity, it is
holden that no man is intitled [sic] to kill him wantonly and willfully; but in so
doing is guilty of murder, unless it happens in the endeavour to apprehend him.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *314-15. Even kings were under the law, as
Sir Edward Coke famously reminded King James I: "[N]on ... sub homine, sed sub Deo et
lege!' ("Not under man, but under God and the law!"). Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 64,
65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (quoting from a medieval Latin treatise attributed to Henry de
Bracton); see 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 33 (Samuel E. Thorne
ed., 1968).
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Ruffin concluded his opinion with a further series of oppositions:
I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this
proposition .... But in the actual condition of things it must be
SO.
That there may be particular instances of cruelty and
deliberate barbarity, where, in conscience, the law might
properly interfere, is most probable .... But we cannot look at
the matter in that light.
I repeat that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful
question. But being brought to it, the Court is compelled to
declare, that ... it will be the imperative duty of the Judges to
recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave .... I
Ruffin's conclusion that the common law provided no analogy
for the master-slave relation found ironic support in a celebrated
English case that Ruffin almost certainly knew but did not cite:
Somerset's Case from 1772. 43 In that case, James Somerset, a slave
who had been brought by his owner from Virginia to England and
who was about to be shipped to Jamaica for sale, petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus from the Court of King's Bench to try the legality of
his confinement.' The reply by the ship's captain who was holding
Somerset recited that the latter was a slave under the laws of Virginia
and Jamaica,4 5 but the court ordered his release, holding that slavery
was unknown to the law of England.4 6

42. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266--68. Ruffin did eventually encounter a case in
which he held that a master had acted with such "cruelty and deliberate barbarity" to a
slave that the master was criminally liable. State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. 500, 503 (1839)
(noting that the torture and murder of a pregnant slave does "not belong to a state of
civilization").
43. Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). Mansfield's decision,
reprinted from Lofft, and expanded reports of the arguments of counsel are given in 20
HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1 (1814), where the name of the plaintiff is spelled Sommersett;
in consequence, the case is often referred to as Sommersett's Case. See, e.g., OXFORD
COMPANION TO LAW 1156 (1980).
44. Somerset's Case, Lofft at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
45. The return is summarized by Lord Mansfield in Somerset's Case.
46. Somerset's Case, Lofft at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
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Explaining the result, Chief Justice Lord Mansfield47 recognized
that slavery existed in various parts of the British Empire and
conceded that contracts for the sale of overseas slaves had been
recognized as valid in England, but found that there was no "positive
law," that is, no statute, confirming the existence of slavery in
England.48 So an answer to the question of its legality had to be
sought in the common law. True to the common law method,
Mansfield searched for an analogy and-like Ruffin-searched in
vain. The medieval status of villainage had been largely abolished a
century earlier, and therefore provided no current analogue.49 And
no claim was asserted based on a contract of labor.5" Without an
47. Although English judges customarily delivered their opinions seriatim (in a series,
one after the other), Mansfield sometimes managed to speak for all the judges of the
Court of King's Bench, a forerunner of the American practice of the opinion of the court
delivered by one judge. See JOHN V. ORTH, The Secret Sources of JudicialPower, in How
MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME COURT? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 23, 34-37 (2006).
48. Somerset's Case, Lofft at 19, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510 ("The state of slavery is of such a
nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only
positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasions, and time itself
from whence it was created, is erased from memory: it's so odious, that nothing can be
suffered to support it, but positive law."). Mansfield used "positive law" in the same sense
as North Carolina Chief Justice Taylor used it later in State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582,
582-83 (1823), to mean statute law, and implicitly contrasted it with the common law
which adapts itself to "reasons, occasions, and time." Perhaps he had in mind the common
law maxim, Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex ("when the reason of the law ceases, so
does the law itself"). See EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 70b (19th ed. 1853); see also, HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF
LEGAL MAXIMS 159-63 (8th Am. ed. 1882) (illustrating applications of the maxim). The
need to provide "positive law" to preserve the status of slavery in states of the United
States that did not otherwise recognize it may explain the inclusion of the Fugitive Slave
Clause in the Federal Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to
Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labour ... ").
49. There were two types of villainage (also spelled villeinage), a form of serfdom
superior to slavery. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *92-93. Villainage
regardant to a manor had been abolished by the Statute of Tenures, 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660).
Villainage in gross might still have been recognized on confession in open court, but that
was not recited in the return to the writ. Somerset's Case, Lofft at 17, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
50. Mansfield noted that:
There is a case in Hobart . .. where a man had contracted to go as a mariner: but
the now case will not come within that decision. Mr. Stewart advances no claim on
contract; he rests his whole demand on a right to the negro as a slave, and
mentions the purpose of detainure to be the sending of him over to be sold in
Jamaica."
Somerset's Case, Lofft at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. The case referenced by Mansfield,
which mentions the situation of the mariner only in dictum, is Coventry v. Woodhall, Hob.
134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1618) ("And generally no man can force his apprentice to go
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analogous case, the common law provided no law to justify
Somerset's confinement.
Like Ruffin in State v. Mann, Mansfield in Somerset's Case
insisted upon the impartiality of the law: "Compassion will not, on

the one hand, nor inconvenience on the other, be to decide[,] but the
law ...."51 Informed of the consequences of a decision in favor of
Somerset-allegedly making possible the freeing of 13,000 or 14,000
slaves presently in England-Mansfield famously declared: "If the

parties will have judgment, fiat justitia, ruat coelum, let justice be
done whatever be the consequences.""2 Unlike State v. Mann, where
the absence of law meant the absence of legal restraint on the
masters' powers over their slaves, in Somerset's Case the absence of
law meant the absence of any legal basis for holding a person as a
slave.
While Ruffin disdained to rest his decision on a technical defect
in the indictment, Mansfield seized on a technical distinction in
Somerset's Case. Mansfield acknowledged that "about fifty years"
earlier Sir Philip Yorke and Lord Chief Justice Talbot-whom

Mansfield respectfully described as "two of the greatest men of their
own or any times" 53-had given their opinion that there was "no
ground in law" for the claim that "if a negro came over [to England],
or became a Christian, he was emancipated."5 4 However, Mansfield

dismissed it as irrelevant because "on a return to a habeas
the only question before us is, whether the cause on the
sufficient?"55 Somerset, in other words, was not required
that he was entitled to be free; rather, the one detaining
required to justify the detention.

corpus[,]
return is
to prove
him was

Furthermore, while Mansfield acknowledged that Parliament
had the power to recognize the condition of slavery in England,56
out of the kingdom, except it be so expressly agreed, or that the nature of his apprenticehood doth import it, as if he be bound apprentice to a merchant-adventurer, or a sailor, or
the like."). In State v. Mann, Ruffin agreed that slavery found no analogue in
apprenticeship. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829).
51. Somerset's Case, Lofft at 17, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
52. Id. The Latin maxim is more literally translated: "Let justice be done, though the
heavens fall." The consequences of Mansfield's decision were not quite so dramatic. See
Ruth Paley, After Somerset: Mansfield, Slavery, and the Law in England, 1772-1830, in
LAW, CRIME & ENGLISH SOCIETY 1660-1830, at 165, 165 (Norma Landau ed., 2002).
53. Somerset's Case, Lofft at 17, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
54. Id. at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
55. Id. at 19, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
56. Id. at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509 ("An application to Parliament, if the merchants
think the question of great commercial concern, is the best, and perhaps the only method
for settling the point for the future.").
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Ruffin took the condition for granted and rather feebly suggested that
the North Carolina General Assembly could provide rules to restrain
slave owners' power over their slaves, if the present lawless condition
proved unsatisfactory. But, he concluded, "the Court is compelled to
declare, that ... until it shall seem fit to the legislature to interpose
express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of
the Judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the
slave.""
Without an analogous human relation to inform North Carolina's
criminal law concerning the treatment of slaves, Ruffin was left with
only the property analogy. "With the liability of the hirer to the
general owner for an injury permanently impairing the value of the
slave no rule now laid down is intended to interfere. That is left upon
the general doctrine of bailment."5 8 In other words, while the masterslave relation was unlike any other human relation known to the
common law, it could be analogized to the non-human condition of
ownership. 9 A slave was like personal property, subject to lease or
bailment-in this case, bailment for hire-and the bailee was
obligated under the general law of bailment to return the bailed
property to the bailor at the end of the hiring in undamaged
condition.6'
It is difficult to say anything good about State v. Mann, except
perhaps to acknowledge the dignified prose in which the brutal
decision is announced. But it does at least reflect honorably on the
common law that in a history extending back more than six hundred
years it could provide no analogy for the relation of a master to a
slave. Because the common law method assumes that every case can
be decided by likening it to some other, the failure to find any similar

57. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 268.
58. Id. at 264; see Jones v. Glass, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 305 (1852) (Ruffin, C.J.) (holding
the hirer of a slave liable in damages for abuse of the slave).
59. Actually, property ownership is a relation among persons, but it is a relation
among persons with respect to something that can be owned, in this case a relation among
"white persons" with respect to slaves. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L. Q. 8, 12 (1927) ("[A] property right is a relation not between an owner and a
thing, but between the owner and other individuals in reference to things.").
60. RAY ANDREW BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 81, at 319 (2d ed.

1955). It is unclear why Ruffin analogizes the hiring of a slave to a bailment rather than to
a lease, although it proved prophetic. See THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY

AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 132 (1996) ("Prior to the 1830s Southern judges searched for
possible common analogies that would cover the legal issues in cases of slave hires. From
the 1830s forward nearly all Southern courts treated them as a species of the law of
bailment .... ).
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case results in no-law. But whereas no-law meant freedom for
Somerset, it meant a reign of terror for North Carolina slaves.

